## 1AC

### Advantage one is stability.

Two internal links.

First, economy. Mexican economy is slumping now. Low wages sink it further.

Murray 14 Christine Murray (journalist for Reuters) “Mexico manufacturing surge hides low-wage drag on economy” June 2nd 2014 Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/02/us-mexico-economy-analysis-idUSKBN0ED20H20140602> JW 2/28/15

But the same low wages that help make manufacturers competitive are a long-term drag on the economy. Millions of people working off the books for paltry sums holds back private consumption, crucial for sustained growth. The government has slashed its growth forecast for 2014 after the economy expanded by just 0.3 percent in the first quarter, well short of expectations. It is a setback for President Enrique Pena Nieto, who has pledged to reinvigorate the economy and lift productivity by pushing through a series of structural reforms that have encouraged investors and helped fuel talk of a "Mexican moment". While Mexico has recaptured manufacturing business it had lost to China, especially in the U.S. market, its economy is hamstrung by chronically low pay, weak public spending and poor productivity. Between 1992 and 2012, exports grew at 8.6 percent a year while the economy as a whole only expanded at an annual average of 2.8 percent. Salaries are a large part of the problem. Between 2005 and 2012, real labor income per capita in Mexico fell 6 percent, the government's social development agency Coneval says. Lower incomes mean less private consumption, which accounts for over two thirds of gross domestic product (GDP). Spending by wealthier Mexicans helps compensate, but falling real wages for many of those living below the poverty line - almost half the population - is dragging down retail sales, which grew just 0.1 percent in 2013. Raul Feliz, an economist at the CIDE think tank in Mexico City, says the country fails to create enough higher quality jobs and has relied too heavily on a glut of cheap labor.

Second, drug cartels. Low wage jobs cause Mexican youth to join drug cartels since they pay more.

Ramsey 12 Geoffrey Ramsey (guest blogger for Latin America Monitor) “Crime pays? Mexico's unemployed youth a driving factor in organized crime” The Christian Science Monitor August 23rd 2012 <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0823/Crime-pays-Mexico-s-unemployed-youth-a-driving-factor-in-organized-crime> JW

Reports that the number of unemployed youths in [Mexico](http://www.insightcrime.org/country-profiles/mexico/item/87-mexico-country-profile) stands at 8 million and is set to rise are bad news for security, as this group makes up the majority of combatants and victims in the country's drug war. [Excelsior published a report](http://www.excelsior.com.mx/index.php?m=nota&seccion=seccion-nacional&cat=1&id_nota=854700) saying that there are currently 8 million Mexicans aged 18 to 30 who are not in work or education – known as “ni-nis” (so labeled because they neither study nor work, "ni estudian ni trabajan"). This is equivalent to more than 20 percent of the age group, and is on the rise, according to the newspaper. The high level of youth unemployment in Mexico is not only a social problem but a factor driving violence and organized crime. Ninis [They] are the main [prey of drug trafficking organizations](http://excelsior.com.mx/index.php?m=nota&seccion=opinion&cat=11&id_nota=852524), making up the majority of victims of drug-related violence, and also serve as the pool from which they draw their [workforce](http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/644098.html), commonly serving as the expendable foot soldiers of gangs and cartels. Crime pays; an enforcer for a large cartel can make nearly three times as much per month as the national average, as demonstrated by the story of six female adolescent Zetas-in-training[captured last year](http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-mexico-drugs-teenagers-idUSTRE75G5F820110617). Many in the country have argued that the government should address the problem of youth unemployment as a matter of national security. In a country where economic opportunities are few and far between, it is argued, young people have little choice but to turn to criminal groups for income.

Strong drug cartels make Mexico collapse

**Shingal 11** Ankur Shingal (Secretary, Mortar Board honor society at UCLA) 2011. [“At the Tipping Point: Why the United States Must Assist Mexico in the Mexican Drug War. Agathai Quarterly, Vol 1, Issue 2, Winter 2011 pp 27] http://www.mortarboardatucla.org/uploads/4/7/8/9/4789362/winter\_journal.pdf#page=26

The third reason why the United States must enhance its aid to Mexico is the possibility of a failed Mexican state. **The drug war** in Mexico **has become a life or death struggle for the Mexican government. Despite substantial US aid,** the Mexican **authorities remain outgunned and outmanned.** The drug cartels, although not acting as an alternative government per say, enjoy near autonomy throughout a number of cities across the country, including border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez. In effect, **the Mexican government has completely committed itself to fighting** against the drug **cartels, but is** at best failing to make progress and at worst **losing the war.** What is even more disheartening is the consideration that **the drug cartels are the ones with time on their side.** While **the Mexican government has neither the resources nor the man power to continue** its major offensive without more substantial assistance from the United States, the drug cartels remain as powerful as ever. It is distinctly possible to foresee a day when the Mexican government, in spite of its efforts, is unable to control the drug cartels, and Mexico essentially becomes a failed state. While there are a number of scholars and politicians, including Mexican President Calderón, who ardently argue that the Mexican state will not fail, it is significant to note that the US government is already preparing itself for that possibility. In fact, **according to a study by** the **U**nited **S**tates **Joint Forces Command,** which looks to uncover future developments to ensure that the US military will not be caught off guard, **Mexico** is considered a ―large and important [state that] **bear[s] consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse.**‖ 177 The study also states that ―the [Mexican] government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by…drug cartels. That internal conflict… [is having] a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state.‖ 178

Mexican economic and social collapse causes global oil shocks.

**Moran 09** Michael Moran, executive editor and policy analyst, Council on Foreign Relations, “Six Crises, 2009: A Half-Dozen Ways Geopolitics Could Upset Global Recovery” 7/31/09, http://fbkfinanzwirtschaft.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/six-crises-2009-a-half-dozen-ways-geopolitics-could-upset-global-recovery/

A story receiving more attention in the American media than Iraq these days is the horrific drug-related violence across the northern states of Mexico, where Felipe **Calderon has deployed the** national **army to combat** two thriving drug **cartels, which have compromised the national police beyond redemption.** The tales of carnage are horrific, to be sure: 30 people were killed in a 48 hour period last week in Cuidad Juarez alone, a city located directly across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. So far, the impact on the United States and beyond has been minimal. But there also isn’t much sign that the army is winning, either, and that raises a disturbing question: What if Calderon loses? The CIA’s worst nightmare during the Cold War (outside of an administration which forced transparency on it, of course) was the radicalization or collapse of Mexico. The template then was communism, but narco-capitalism doesn’t look much better. The prospect of a wholesale collapse that sent millions upon millions of Mexican refugees fleeing across the northern border so far seems remote. **But Mexico’s army has its own** problems with **corruption**, and a sizeable number of Mexicans regard Calderon’s razor-thin 2006 electoral victory over a leftist rival as illegitimate. **With Mexico’s economy reeling and the** traditional **safety valve of** illegal **immigration to America dwindling, the potential for serious trouble exists.** Meanwhile, **Mexico ranks with Saudi Arabia and Canada as the three suppliers of oil the U**nited **S**tates **could not do without. Should things come unglued** there and Pemex production shut down even temporarily, **the shock on oil markets could be profound,** again, **sending** its **waves throughout the global economy.** Long-term, PEMEX production has been sliding anyway, thanks to oil fields well-beyond their peak and restrictions on foreign investment. Domestically in the U.S., any trouble involving Mexico invariably will cause a bipartisan demand for more security on the southern border, inflame anti-immigrant sentiment and possibly force Obama to remember his campaign promise to “renegotiate NAFTA,” a pledge he deftly sidestepped once in office.

Oil shocks cause multiple scenarios for extinction.

**Lendman 07** Stephen Lendman, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization. “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?,” Rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm]

**With** the world's energy supplies finite, **the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near** or approaching, **"security" for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we can't do without. It includes waging wars to get it**, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. **That means** energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, **militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and** now **an extremist US administration willing to risk Armageddon** for world dominance. Central **to** its plan is first **control**ling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with **oil** and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, **it's the US with** help from **Israel,** Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, **South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons** and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over. **Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing**, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."  Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. **There may be nothing left** but resilient beetles and bacteria **in the wake of a nuclear holocaust** meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

### Advantage two is labor reform.

Reform of maquiladora factories sets an international standard for worker rights.

Bandy 02 Joe Bandy (Department of Sociology/Anthropology, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine) “So What Is to Be Done?: Maquila Justice Movements, Transnational Solidarity, and Dynamics of Resistance” Social Costs of Industrial and Urban Growth on the U.S. Mexican Border

Endeavors of labor networks to empower maquila workers have had mixed results. Given the repression they face, their limited resources, and continuing internal conflicts, the very survival of cross-border labor networks for maquila justice has been a positive result. Beyond survival, however, some episodes of labor conflict have resulted in changes that workers have regarded as progressive. There have been corporatere forms to toxic dumping and abusive labor relations; workers have received precedent-setting legal verdicts and settlements in both national and international tribunals; labor rights education has informed countless citizens; and as we will see, workers have had qualified successes in unionization and collective bargaining. In these efforts, coalition has functioned to magnify the strengths of individual organizations, and each success has fortified hopes in a growing transnational civil society that can help to institute a more democratic form of development. In many instances, however, workers’ goals have not been achieved and the hopes of regulating transnational capital are dim. In these cases, corporations have fired and intimidated activists; Mexican government leaders and official unions have obstructed independent unionization and harassed workers; activists have had limited resources to devote to organizing; or workers’ coalitions have conflicted over strategy, organizational development, or identity issues such as nationality, disrupting their unity and power. Indeed, at this moment in history, the forces of economic liberalization appear far stronger than those of democratic regulation, prompting social movements worldwide to ask, not unlike Lenin (1929), what is to be done?To this question there may be as many answers as there are movements. Yet, among labor organizations, each episode of conflict with corporations and government has facilitated the development of common, coordinated strategies of resistance. To understand the most current phase of labor movement activism and the power dynamics between labor and capital in the maquilas, it will be helpful to discuss two of the most recent and prominent cases of labor mobilizations in the maquilas – that at the HanYoung plant in Tijuana, Baja California from 1997 to 1999, and that against the 3Kukdong/Mexmode maquila in Atlixco, Puebla from 2000 to 2002. Clearly, there have been many precedent-setting labor struggles in Mexican maquilas since the late 1970sthat could be discussed here – Solidev, Sony, ALCOA, GE, Maxiswitch, or Duro – yet Han Young and Kukdong are arguably the most instructive. Each movement was able to achieve new precedents of unionization, one government recognition, the other a labor contract. Further, each demonstrates slightly different paradigms of resistance to export processing, with distinct strategic opportunities, regional influences, and outcomes. HanYoung represents at once one of the greatest successes and failures of maquila labo rmovements, while many regard that of Kukdong/Mexmode to be a new model for laborinternationalism in North America. Thus, a comparative analysis of these cases willprovide insights into the industrial conflict in the maquila sector. This discussion is grounded in ten extended (2-3 hour) interviews of the lead activists and workers participating in each conflict, conducted during 1997-8 for the Han Young case and during 2001 for Kukdong. Additionally, government reports and movement documents –communiqués, monitoring reports, action alerts, protest faxes/letters, media packages,etc. – will be discussed. Lastly, this research was conducted as part of a much larger study of U.S.-Mexico labor coalitions involving over one-hundred interviews with activists, maquila managers, and government officials, as well as over six years of selective participation in workers’ movements, providing many other relevant insights.

Human rights promotion solves international aggression-empirically proven.

**Burke-White 4** William W. Burke-White (Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge). “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation.” The Harvard Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis. 2004.

Soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Michael Ignatieff asked: “Is the Human Rights Era Ending?” He asserted that for the movement to remain relevant it has “to challenge directly the claim that national security trumps human rights.”147 This article strives to do just that. It has suggest[s]ed a correlation between a state’s domestic human rights record and its propensity to engage in international aggression. In the post–Cold War period, every instance of aggression was either initiated by a state that systematically denied the human rights of its own citizens or was undertaken by a human rights respecting state at least in part to protect the human rights of citizens in the target state. Taken in conjunction with the numerous statistical studies on the democratic peace phenomenon, these findings appear likely to be accurate. Both institutional constraints and social beliefs may offer causal mechanisms for this human rights peace. Additional studies, relying on political science methods of statistical regression analysis, will be necessary to isolate other variables and prove the robustness of this correlation.

### Contention three is solvency.

Current minimum wage in Mexico is less than five US dollars per day.

Vallarta 14 Vallarta Daily “Mexico’s Minimum Wage Increase Lower Than $5 USD Per Day” December 30th 2014 <http://www.vallartadaily.com/mexico-minimum-wage/> 2/28/15 JW

Mexico's minimum wage increases on January 1, 2015 and remains below $5 USD per day. Puerto Vallarta employees remain in Zone-B with the lowest wage requirement in the country. Mexico’s minimum wage guidelines are broken down into two zones, known as Zone-A and Zone-B, where minimum wages are set at different rates. Zone-A consists of larger cities and those of economic importance to the country, while Zone-B maintains some of the nation’s poorest municipalities. On January 1, 2015 new minimum wages will go in effect for both Zone-A and Zone-B, however employers in Puerto Vallarta will fall in Zone-B allowing a minimum wage less than employers in Guadalajara even though the cost of living in Puerto Vallarta is significantly higher in terms of quality housing and food costs. In Guadalajara and other areas marked as Zone-A in Mexico, the new minimum wage will be set at a dismal $70.10 pesos per day ($4.80 USD for a full day’s work). While in Puerto Vallarta and other areas marked as Zone-B will have the minimum daily wage set at $66.45 pesos ($4.55 USD for a full day’s work). The current zone system ensures that the poorest communities in Mexico maintain their status, even though the minimum wage constitutionally is required to be set at a living wage in Mexico. There is no evidence that Zone-A or Zone-B offer a living wage. The cost of living increase in Puerto Vallarta has outpaced that of the state’s capital city of Guadalajara, but still remains in Zone-B with the lowest minimum wage in the country.

Workers in Mexico are in abject poverty, exploited by large corporations paying them minimum wage. Living wage is key to solve.

Magliano 12 Tony Magliano (internationally syndicated social justice and peace columnist) “Pope's Mexican trip calls to mind corporate injustice” National Catholic Reporter April 10th 2012 JW 2/28/15

Kernaghan said the multinational corporations that have established themselves in Mexico, being worldclass competitors, will employ Mexican workers for as little as they can get away with, place them in miserable working and living conditions, and push them to the limit to maximize production. A typical example, according to Kernaghan, is the giant U.S. aluminum company Alcoa. In the Mexican border cities of Acuña and Piedras Negras where Alcoa operated 13 factories, more than 15,000 workers earned on average less than $1 an hour assembling automotive electrical systems for U.S. companies like Ford and Harley-Davidson. Libby Archell, director of corporate affairs for Alcoa, recently called me to explain that Alcoa now has only three factories operating in Mexico, and that workers there, as in all of their factories worldwide, receive at least the minimum wage mandated by each country. She added that Alcoa fully respects all worker rights everywhere they operate. But Kernaghan said the many U.S. and Canadian corporations that abuse workers in their foreign factories all say the same thing. These companies all say they respect human and labor rights when, in fact, they don't. In Alcoa's case, even if the rights of workers are now respected, what about all of the well-documented labor abuses in the Mexican factories they previously owned? The more than 15,000 former Alcoa workers suffered tremendously, and Alcoa has not given them the restitution that justice demands. During investigative visits between 2002 and 2007, Kernaghan found many Alcoa workers subsisting in desperate poverty. He saw them living in one room shacks made of scrap wood, old shipping pallets, cardboard and tar paper, with no running water. He said a wage of less than $1 an hour is not nearly enough to live like a human being . To survive, many workers still cross the U.S. border regularly to sell their blood. Kernaghan added that many Mexican workers lost their jobs when they spoke out against Alcoa injustices. He said that in 2009, Alcoa sold its wire-harnessing plants in Acuña and Piedras Negras. The factories are now owned by PKC Group, which continues to export automotive electrical systems to automakers in the United States. But according to local worker rights advocates, conditions have not improved. The workers still earn a base rate of about $40 a week, and they are not allowed to have an independent, democratic union. During his visit, Benedict urged Mexicans "not to yield to a utilitarian mentality, which always leads to the sacrifice of the weakest and most defenseless." But because the globalized economic system overwhelmingly favors rich individuals and rich corporations, poor workers in Mexico and throughout the world have little choice but to yield to the utilitarian mentality of most American and Canadian corporations, which treat workers with less dignity than the things they make. Catholic social teaching insists that workers deserve a living wage and the right to form independent unions.

Thus, the plan: The United Mexican States will raise the minimum wage for manufacturing workers to 249.58 pesos/hour. The wage floor will be adjusted annually indexed to purchasing power parities.

Regil 11 clarifies normal means and is the solvency advocate Alvaro J. de Regil (Executive Director of The Jus Semper Global Alliance) “Mexico’s Wage Gap Charts” The Jus Semper Global Alliance December 2011 JW 2/28/15

The concept of a living wage using PPPs is straightforward. To determine real wages in terms of the purchasing power of any country in question, the PPPs of this country are applied to nominal wages. These are the real wages for each country, § Purchasing power parities reflect the amount in dollars required in a given country to have the same purchasing power that $1 U.S. has in the United States; e.g.: if the PPP index in one country is 69, then $0,69 dollars are required in that country to buy the same that $1 buys in the U.S.; thus, the cost of living is lower. If the PPP were to be higher than 100, say 120, then $1,20 is required in that country to buy the same that $1 buys in the U.S.; the cost of living is, thus, higher, § To calculate a living wage, the real wage of a specific category of U.S. workers is used as the benchmark, and the PPPs of a country in question are then applied to the U.S. wage, § This provides the equivalent living wage that a worker in the country in question should be earning in order to be at par in terms of purchasing power to the material quality of life enjoyed by the equivalent U.S. worker. This is the equalised wage in terms of purchasing power, § In this way, the comparison between the actual real wage of the country in question exposes the gap, in real terms, between the current real wage of the worker of the country in question and the living wage it should be earning, in order to be equally compensated in terms of PPPs, § In practice, since the PPPs vary annually, due to the dynamics of economic forces, the pace of the gradual equalisation of wages, through small real-wage increases, needs to be reviewed annually. § It must be pointed out that this rationale does not even take into consideration that the neoliberal paradigm of staunch support for supply-side economics has consistently depressed for three decades the purchasing power of real wages in the U.S., the benchmark country for wage equalisation. This has been attempted to be resolved by women joining the work force and, fictitiously, through over indebtedness, which eventually has brought us down to the great implosion of capitalism in 2008. In this way, this equalisation analysis is made in the context of a course set forth during three decades of global depression of real wages in favour of international financial capital. A Classic Example in 2009 § Equivalent manufacturing workers in Mexico and Brazil earn only 23% and 33%, respectively, of what they should be making in order to be compensated at par with their U.S. counterparts in terms of purchasing power, § U.S. Workers earn $26,19/hour whilst Mexican and Brazilian workers earn only $3,81/hour and $6,81/hour, respectively, § Since costs of living in PPPs terms in Mexico and Brazil are 64¢ and 80¢, respectively, for each $1 U.S. dollar, equivalent Mexican and Brazilian manufacturing workers should be earning instead $16,70/hour and $20,90/hour, respectively, in order to enjoy equal purchasing power compensation, § The difference is the wage gap that employers perversely keep to increase profits, § Canada, in contrast, has a small gap with its U.S. counterparts, since its nominal wage ($26,40) is 90% of the equivalent wage ($29,47) needed to be at par, with a PPP of $1,13 per each $1 U.S. dollar.

### Framework

The standard is maximizing life.

1. Actor specificity-key to the text of the resolution which is the basis for all burdens-the resolution is a question of government action for which there is no act/omission distinction.

Sunstein Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele, “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs,” Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 85 (March 2005), p. 17.

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

If there’s no act/omission-life comes first since its instrumental in pursuing all other values so means based frameworks collapse to the aff. Impacts-A. no skep or presumption-governments are always forced to take some action so deflationary arguments have no impact, B. no generic util indicts-policymakers can act in cases of uncertainty-they still have a general idea.

2. Moral uncertainty means we should preserve life to find ethical truth in the future.

Bostrom Nick Bostrom, 2001 prof of Philosophy, Oxford University Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March 2002. First version: 2001 March, JStor

These reflections on moral uncertainty suggest[s] an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know—at least not in concrete detail—what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then we should recognize that there is a great option value in preserving—and ideally improving—our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.

3. Empiricism. Morality must be based in empirical facts to avoid infinite regress.

Richards Robert, “A Defense of Evolutionary Ethics,” *Biology and Philosophy*, (1986) 265-293

This brief discussion of justification of ethical principles indicates how the concept of justification must, I believe, be employed. "To justify" means "**to demonstrate that a proposition** or system of propositions **conforms to a set of** acceptable **rules**, a set of acceptable factual propositions, or a set of acceptable practices. The order of justification is from rules to empirical propositions about beliefs and practices. That is, if **rules serving as** inference principles or the rules serving **as premises** (e.g., the Golden Rule) **of a justifying argument are themselves put to the test, then they must** be shown to **conform [to]** either to still **more general rules or** to **empirical propositions** about common beliefs and practices. **Barring an infinite regress, this procedure must end in** what are regarded as acceptable beliefs or **practices**. Aristotle, for instance, justified the forms of syllogistic reasoning by showing that they made explicit the patterns employed in argument by rational men. Kant justified the categorical imperative and the postulates of practical reason by demonstrating, to his satisfaction, that they were the necessary conditions of common moral experience: that is, he justified normative principles by showing that their application to particular cases reproduced the common moral conclusions of 18th century German burgers and Pietists. If this is an accurate rendering of the concept of justification, then the justification of first moral principles and inference rules must ultimately lead to an appeal to the beliefs and practices of [people], **which** of course **is an empirical appeal.** So **moral principles** ultimately **can be justified only by facts.**

The only morally accessible empirical facts are pain and pleasure-we can’t escape the fundamental fact that pleasure feels good and pain feels bad.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) "The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism" http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3

One can form a variety of beliefs **using phenomenal introspection**. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they are bright experiences. And **when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make** some **judgments about their intrinsic features** – for example, that they are good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and appreciate its brightness, **one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and appreciate its goodness.** When I consider **[in] a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before**, in the same way I form the belief that there is more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. **"Pleasure"** here **refers to the hedonic tone of experience**. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having this hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it is hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” Some philosophers, like Fred Feldman, see pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone. But as long **as hedonic tones** – good and bad feelings – **are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness.** Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. **There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences [like]**. There are **sensory pleasures,** like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the **pleasures of seeing** that **our desires** are **satisfied**, like the **pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed**. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences we have when looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It is easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). **But** just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, **pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues** (109). As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences. **Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad**. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).

### EM

Use an epistemically modest method of framework evaluation-that’s probability of the moral theory multiplied by the action’s value under the theory if it were true-3 reasons.

1. An ethically modest method of evaluation is most consistent with real world decision making.

Overing and Bistagne 14 Bob Overing (TOC finalist 2012) and Adam Bistagne (triple-major in Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics, coach for Loyola) “Ethical Modesty Part 1” Premier Debate Today August 31st 2014 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/>

First, ethical modesty seems consistent with everyday decision-making. The following example is taken from the dissertation of Andrew Sepielli, now a professor at the University of Toronto: Suppose that I am deciding whether to drink a cup of coffee. I have a degree of belief of .2 that the coffee is mixed with a deadly poison, and a degree of belief of .8 that it’s perfectly safe. If I act on the hypothesis in which I have the highest credence, I’ll drink the coffee. But this seems like a bad call. A good chance of coffee isn’t worth such a significant risk of death – at least, not if I assign commonsensical values to coffee and death, respectively.[1] It’s hard to argue that confidence gets it right here. We should think similarly when deliberating about normative theories. Employing some social-contract theory, we might think that the United States government should take only Constitutional action; however, some Constitutional violation might be permissible to protect a large city from a terrorist attack even if we care less about utilitarian reasons.

2. Letting the aff weigh the plan is key to structural reciprocity.

Overing and Bistagne 2 Bob Overing (TOC finalist 2012) and Adam Bistagne (triple-major in Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics, coach for Loyola) “Ethical Modesty Part 1” Premier Debate Today August 31st 2014 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/>

That’s all well and good but why should we adopt it in debate? Ethical modesty might remedy a lot of the fairness concerns with frameworks. Necessary/insufficient burdens, skepticism, and unturnable cases lose their force when the criterion is no longer all-or-nothing. Those arguments create reciprocity problems precisely because they exclude the opponent’s offense. Under a frame of ethical modesty, they would not be exclusive; the aff can weigh its offense. Status quo LD framework debate incentivizes finding frameworks that heavily favor one side such that winning the criterion is sufficient to vote. More reasonable, inclusive frameworks are crowded out in favor of more unfair ones. For instance, a deontological framework is a predictable, reasonable framework, but ethical confidence makes it much more likely to create structural unfairness. If the neg defends a narrow conception of deontology, a strong act/omission distinction, that perfect duties strictly precede imperfect duties, and that any risk of a violation of the standard is sufficient to negate, aff offense under the neg framework is effectively impossible. These arguments alone are not problematic, however. If the aff can weigh the advantages of the plan even when the framework debate favors the neg, then the aff still has options. Modesty makes the strength of the aff impacts matter at the end of the day. Perhaps such a method of evaluation will help the time-pressured 1AR beat back neg layering strategies without resorting to theory arguments.

3. Modesty causes innovative framework debates.

Overing and Bistagne 3 Bob Overing (TOC finalist 2012) and Adam Bistagne (triple-major in Philosophy, Economics and Mathematics, coach for Loyola) “Ethical Modesty Part 1” Premier Debate Today August 31st 2014 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2014/08/31/moral-modesty-part-1-by-bob-overing-and-adam-bistagne/>

Ethical modesty might also encourage LDers to make multiple kinds of moral arguments in a given round. For instance, instead of defending utilitarianism to the death, a debater might also forward rights-based or contract-based reasons. This model would be a less dogmatic form of framework debating that largely reflects how applied philosophy is done. When thinking about abortion, drone strikes, or physician-assisted suicide, a comprehensive analysis would include justification from a variety of moral perspectives. Additionally, with more frameworks in any given debate, the cost to introducing an ethical principle would be much lower since a debater would have others to fall back on. If a framework can be ‘kicked’ at little strategic loss, debaters might be more willing to ditch their tired framework backfiles in favor of more innovative strategies. Ethical modesty might inject some life into deont vs. util debates that have largely characterized even the best framework debates in LD for some time.

Education is a voter since it’s the portable purpose of debate.

### Underview

First, neg abuse outweighs aff abuse-neg won 66% of outrounds at VBT proving you have the advantage.

Second, use reasonability on topicality with a brightline of a solvency advocate in the topic literature and the presence of link and impact turn ground. A. there are tons of many mutually exclusive T interps and I can’t possibly know which one you’ll read so I shouldn’t be punished for setting ground. B. increases topical clash-as long as you can debate under my plan the substantive education we receive outweighs time spent reading T.

Third, T is an RVI for the aff if I win a counter interp-the nature of T makes it a NIB since it’s a layer before theory and the neg doesn’t have to be topical so I can’t turn it-outweighs other disads to the RVI since it’s intrinsic the structure of theory and not a side effect or substantive abuse.

Fourth, the role of the ballot is to evaluate the aff policy action. Acting like policymakers is educational.

Shaw PEDAGOGY IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Using Role-Play Scenarios in the IR Classroom: An Examination of Exercises on Peacekeeping Operations and Foreign Policy Decision Making CAROLYN M. SHAW Wichita State University 2004

The use of role-playing in the classroom provides an alternative method for presenting course materials in contrast to lecturing. Although some materials can be conveyed well through an oral presentation, many concepts in international relations only become less abstract when the student can apply them directly or experience them personally (Preston, 2000). ‘‘To the extent that they engage in constructing new knowledge or reconstructing given information, rather than simply memorizing it, they gain a deeper understanding’’ (King, 1994:16). Merryfield and Remy (1995:8) similarly note that ‘‘students master content not only by being exposed to information through readings and lectures...but also by engaging in a reflective process in which they make the information their own by evaluating and using it.’’ Since class trips abroad are beyond the scope of most courses, simulations can be used to place students in a unique international context or position which they would otherwise be unable to experience, and give them the opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the material. One challenge that instructors face is the trade-off in terms of coverage of material and the time it takes to conduct an active learning exercise. Such exercises usually take more time than covering the same materials in lecture format (Boyer et al., 2000:4). The key to using role-playing effectively without sacrificing too much content is to plan the exercise carefully to provide interactive examples of the course materials. Frequently this can be done in coordination with a preparatory lecture. The concepts can be introduced prior to the exercise, and then participation in the exercise provides the students with concrete examples of more abstract theories and ideas presented in the lecture. For example, when learning about the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making, students are often frustrated that the government actors involved cannot simply ‘‘reach a consensual agreement and do what’s best for our country.’’ By actually taking on the roles of the different agencies involved in foreign policy making, students begin to understand the underlying conflicts between these actors and the challenge of clearly defining what is in our ‘‘national interest.’’

## Stuff

### A2 Competition DA

My internal links to econ outweigh:

A. permanent structural damage to the economy-maquiladoras can always compensate by laying a few people off or raising prices on products

B. specificity-my ev compares the benefits of competitiveness versus consumer spending and decides its better to raise wages

C. probability-maquiladoras have had fluctuating performance in the past and no bad things have happened

### 1AR Heg Add-On

Mexican failed state collapses US hegemony-it becomes a proxy for Russia, Iran and China.

Pease 11 Shaad Pease (BS in Political Science and an MA in International Security) “instability in the South: The Implications of Mexican State Failure on U.S. National Security” 2011 A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver <http://digitaldu.coalliance.org/fedora/repository/codu%3A63197/ETD_Pease_denver_0061M_10408.pdf-0/master>

A failed state scenario in Mexico would provide the Iranians with enough international cover to conduct such attacks. The Iranians past and present dealings with terrorist organizations also lends itself to the belief that this state may work with the various drug trafficking organizations operating in Mexico in order to facilitate their operations. The activities of Iran in the Middle East region as well as an increasing presence in Latin America should be a cause of concern for American policymakers as it is likely that Iran would use Mexico in order to destabilize American interests. This section of the thesis will now focus on Russia and the likelihood that this country will attempt to garner more influence in the Western region by exploiting Mexican autonomy. The Russian state has begun to take greater interest in Latin America. This became evident in 2008 when Russia offered the left-leaning government of Bolivia aid to help fight narcotics traffickers in that country.128 The country of Bolivia and the leftist President Evo Morales are attempting to garner more support from states other than America. This type of action is mirrored by the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Russia has attempted to strengthen its ties with Chavez and the Venezuelan state. This relationship is representative “of geopolitical forces rising to challenge U.S. leadership and influence. The Venezuelan-Russian duo wants to redistribute global power as expediently as possible. In pursuit of this world without the West…”129 However, the actions of Russia in a failed Mexican state would differ significantly from activities performed by other states, such as Iran. Russia is unlikely to engage in nefarious actions that directly target the United States; nevertheless, Russia may try to acquire greater influence in the country of Mexico once that state becomes more destabilized. This activity would most likely take place due to Russia’s drive for recognition as a global power. The fall of the Soviet Union as a hegemonic power in the early 1990s had a lasting effect on many Russians. The attempt to garner greater influence in the Western Hemisphere by the Russian state may display a willingness to retrieve this loss of status and prestige. A realistic concern for Russian involvement in Mexico deals with the economy. Russia may attempt to establish itself as an economic entity in Mexico in order to secure possible contracts and dealings during and after a revival of the Mexican state. Russia has become a more than willing participant in selling weapons to various states throughout the years. This issue is clearly evident with Russia‟s arms deal with the Venezuelan state that encompassed 2.2 billion in a line of credit: “this deal is about one quarter the size- to take one comparison- of all of Britain‟s arms sales in 2008.”130 This past activity involving large sales of military equipment may become apparent in a country that is seeking any assistance it can receive due to its dire security circumstances. Although both Iran and Russia will most likely seek to profit from an ailing Mexican state, the country of China will also attempt to strengthen its position in Latin America, particularly in Mexico. The Chinese government has expanded its influence in many parts of the world recently. Officials from China have traveled to numerous African states for the purpose of becoming an important creditor and donor; thus, expanding their influence and prestige. The Chinese economy has rapidly expanded, and this trend seems to be continuing. According to the Chinese Vice Commerce Minister, Fu Zinying, “China’s presence in Africa is becoming more and more market driven, the actors operating there are diverse, there are many models, and the areas they are in are broad.”1 jl China’s aspiration to become a great economic power is evident; furthermore, their role as an emerging military power, one which may attempt to counter the military of the United States, is also an issue of concern. The Chinese role in Latin America is somewhat limited in its scope in comparison to that of Africa, but it is a role that American policymakers must be aware of. Additionally, Chinese interest in Mexico may become a concern if that state collapses further and becomes a failed state. The Chinese may take advantage of Mexico in order to expand their influence and natural resource pool in Latin America. Unlike Iran, who has extremely hostile intentions to the welfare of the United States, China will most likely attempt to provide economic assistance to the Mexican government in a fashion that is similar to that of Russia. Mexico would most likely accept most types of assistance from donor states in an attempt to revitalize their failing country. While the United States will lead the pack in this effort, it is likely that other nations will also try to expand their influence as well. This apparent issue poses a problem for American national security. Chinese economic incentives to Mexico would hinder American influence in the region. The failing and desperate Mexican government may extend a warm welcome to the Chinese; this act could provide China with greater influence as they would potentially provide economic aid packages to Mexico, and would presumably expect some type of mutual reciprocity from the Mexican government. Additionally, China may attempt to further expand their influence in Latin American states other than Mexico which would advance the prestige of many anti-American leaders. Two such leaders are Evo Morales in Bolivia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. The Bolivarian leader as well as Venezuela’s President could claim to have attained a strong pact with an emerging economic and military power in order to advance their agendas, agendas that do not coincide with that of the United States. Furthermore, Chinese expansionism in Mexico may provide leverage for the Chinese positions on issues such as N. Korea and Taiwan as greater influence in the Western Hemisphere would provide China with greater power in these cases. This would undoubtedly place the United States at a disadvantage if China garnered greater authority with the Mexican state.

Heg prevents mass conflicts. Decline causes extinction from nuclear war.

Barnett 11 Thomas (Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense) “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 2011 World Politics Review http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S.** military **has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed** from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended.** Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would** now **be no** identifiable human **civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered** the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, **America** stepped up and **changed everything by usher[ed]ing in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the** persistent **spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a** roughly **10-fold increase in** adjusted global **GDP and** a **profound** and persistent **reduction in** battle **deaths from** state-based **conflict**s. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a** 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent **relative** drop in deaths **due to war.** We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

### Cartels cause ollapse

Cartels are the strongest internal link to Mexican instability-outweighs alt causes.

Pedigo 12 David Pedigo (journalist Santiago Times, B.A. Beloit College, M.A., internally citing Jorge Castaneda, Mexico’s Secrety of Foreign Affairs from 2000-2003) “The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico” 2012 http://research.monm.edu/mjur/files/2012/2012-7.pdf

Introduction Few topics are more relevant to the national security of the United States today than the crisis in Mexico, which threatens to create a failed state on the southern border. In 2009, noted international relations scholar John Mearsheimer listed the ongoing drug war in Mexico as the number one issue that had been overlooked by President Obama, saying that, “There is the very real possibility that Mexico will implode on Obama's watch and become a failed state, which would surely cause serious problems north of the Rio Grande.”1 This claim has been echoed by Steven David, another eminent scholar in the field of international relations, who states in his book, Catastrophic Consequences, that, “there is no question that if violent instability engulfs Mexico, American vital interests would be threatened.”2 While no single definition of a “failed state” currently exists, one of the most widely accepted indicators of state failure is what Max Weber referred to as the “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” within a state’s territory. In other words, failed states emerge when the ultimate authority to provide security and enforce the rule of law comes from a power other than the state.3 By this qualification, Mexico certainly is not a failed state today, but it does exhibit many characteristics of a “captured state,” wherein the state itself is manipulated by other actors -- in this case drug cartels. There are also some regions throughout Mexico’s territory where drug cartels have more influence over the rule of law than the state, and can therefore be considered “failed provinces” or “failed cities.” In these regions, cartels freely murder mayors, police officers, and journalists that challenge their authority, sometimes within feet of police posts. Not only is the Mexican state unable to provide security for its population, but cartels have increasingly influenced government policy through intimidating, killing, or buying off state actors. As both Mearsheimer and David suggest, state failure in Mexico would have devastating effects for the United States. Some of the violence and lawlessness of the drug war in Mexico have already begun to leak across the border. In 2005, the governors of Arizona and New Mexico declared their border regions with Mexico to be a “disaster area” on the grounds that they were devastated by human smuggling, drug smuggling, kidnapping, murder, and destruction of property.4 There have also been recent concerns over southern Arizona becoming a “no-go zone” controlled by drug traffickers.5 These instances lend credibility to the presupposition that “failed cities” like the ones in Mexico may begin to emerge in the United States as well if Mexico’s recent trends are not reversed. In this paper, I will examine the prospects for Mexico to avoid becoming a failed state. The first section will provide a background of the current drug war, giving a historical analysis of how the situation has developed to what it is today. This section will examine the goals of past policies and how they succeeded or failed to meet such goals. In the next section I will provide a review of debates and theories currently surrounding this topic and examine the opinions, criticisms, and suggestions of experts in the field. I will then begin the next section by briefly explaining how I mean to test my own theory on the conflict in Mexico. This theory posits that cartel power relative to the state apparatus is the central variable causing Mexico’s descent toward failed state status, and a policy to prevent state failure must effectively reduce this power. The next section will offer evidence to support this theory and explain the causal links between these variables. In doing so, it will offer policy suggestions on how to reduce the power of cartels and restore the Mexican state’s monopoly on the use of force. I will then end with a brief conclusion.

## Prolly not useful

### Violence increasing now

Violence is increasing in Mexico because of drug wars.

Bender 14 Jeremy Bender and Armin Rosen “Mexico’s Drug War Is Entering A Dark Phase” Business Insider October 24th 2014 <http://www.businessinsider.com/mexicos-drug-war-is-entering-a-dangerous-phase-2014-10#ixzz3ItaOzmEb>

Despite some successes, like the February capture of the infamous Chapo Guzman, the war has resulted in a horrific death toll and the erosion of civil liberties and basic public safety in large parts of the country. October has brought a wave of drug war news. Some of it has been positive: three major trafficking figures have been arrested since October 1, including the heads of the Gulf and Juarez cartels and the founder of the Beltran Leyva organization. But in early October, corrupt police officers working with drug traffickers and local politicians abducted and possibly murdered 43 student teachers from a town halfway between Mexico City and the Pacific coast, in Gurerrero State. On October 10, Mexican journalist Leon Krauze described the incident as "the latest rearing of the beast's head" — the worst in a series of troubling incidents in the state. "Guerrero," Krauze wrote in The New Republic, "[is the] current epicenter of Mexico’s nightmare. For a while now, rival gangs have been fighting for control of the state. The result has been the usual parade of horrors: cities besieged (including Acapulco), governments infiltrated, journalists threatened, police corrupted. And death. And vengeance." The drug war, originally launched by former President Felipe Calderon, was first undertaken using a kingpin strategy that aimed at severing the head of each of the cartels operating in the country — backed with the mass deployment of the Mexican military to the country's worst trouble-spots. Both efforts have had a profound effect upon Mexican society: at least 60,000 people died between 2006 and 2012 as a result of a war that pitted various criminal enterprises against the Mexican army and a constellation of vigilante groups — as well as against each other. Calderon's successor, President Pena Nieto, promised that he would reform the drug war when he took office. Instead of focusing on arresting the heads of the cartels, Nieto said he would undertake a general policy of combating crime and fostering rule of law. Beltran Leyva CartelHandout ./REUTERSSoldiers escort head of the Beltran Leyva drug cartel Hector Beltran Leyva in Mexico City, in this handout picture taken October 1, 2014 and released to Reuters on October 2, 2014 by the Attorney General's Office. Despite these promises, Nieto's policy towards the drug war remains strikingly similar to Calderon's — even though, as Krauze argues, he's been far more hesitant than his predecessor to talk about the country's crisis. Within the past month, three major kingpins from three different cartels have been arrested, including the first ever arrest of a Mexican cartel leader on US soil. Despite the arrests, the security situation continues to deteriorate throughout the country as various gangs and organized crime organizations splinter and compete, sometimes as a result of the uncertainty that follows the takedown of a cartel kingpin. Organized crime groups “are every day more fragmented,” Steven S. Dudley, a director of InsightCrime.org, a website that tracks crime in Latin America, told The New York Times on Oct. 21. “In principle, this is what the government wants, but in places like Tamaulipas, this has not resulted in less violence. In fact, this process has contributed to making the state one of the most violent in Mexico.” Dwight Dyer of Control Risks had the same concern, telling the Financial Times on Oct. 2 that "the security situation is worsening in general in the country." The drug war has created an environment in which human rights are violated at an "alarmingly high rate" by criminal elements and the country's various levels of government, according to the UN Human Rights Council. Mexican Soldiers Drug WarHenry Romero/REUTERSOctober 07, 2014 Soldiers patrol atop a vehicle along the streets in Iguala, southern Mexican state of Guerrero, October 7, 2014. The council found that the general militarization of Mexico during the drug war has created an atmosphere of lawlessness and impunity, with drug traffickers executing their enemies at will and the vast majority of murders going unpunished. The report found that between December 2006 and November 2012, 102 [thousand],696 homicides took place, of which 70% were drug related. Of these homicides, only 1-2% were investigated to the point of conviction. This state of lawlessness has permeated Mexico's public sector. The 43 students who disappeared in the southern town of Iguala had been protesting against the local government. It is now believed that the students were arrested by local police and handed over to the gang Guerreros Unidos under the orders of the mayor and his wife in an effort to stop political dissent.

### Growth k2 relations

Mexican growth is key to US-Mexico relations. Cooperation between Nieto and Obama is predicated off economic concerns.

Seelke 13 Clare Ribando Seelke (Specialist in Latin American Affairs ) “Mexico’s Peña Nieto Administration: Priorities and Key Issues in U.S.-Mexican Relations” August 15th 2013 Congressional Research Service http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/213989.pdf

As Mexico is experiencing a major domestic shift in power, U.S.-Mexican relations could also be in for some changes. This year marks the first time in 12 years that U.S. and Mexican presidential terms are beginning at roughly the same time. While President Barack Obama and President Peña Nieto both face a full slate of domestic challenges, analysts have urged both leaders to work together on issues that are of critical importance to both countries, particularly those aimed at boosting trade and job creation. At a pre-inaugural meeting in late November 2012, President Obama embraced President Peña Nieto’s desire to bolster economic ties and to focus on a broad array of bilateral issues rather than focusing predominantly on security issues.3 Congress and the United States have a strong interest in the impact of the Peña Nieto government on economic and security conditions in Mexico and on U.S.-Mexican relations. Economically, the United States and Mexico are heavily interdependent, and the U.S. economy could benefit if Mexico is able to sustain or expand its economic growth rate (which has averaged 3% over the last three years). Similarly, security conditions in Mexico affect U.S. national security, particularly along the nearly 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border. Congress may closely monitor whether the reduction in organized-crime related violence that Mexico experienced in 2012 can be sustained without jeopardizing bilateral efforts against drug trafficking and organized crime. Maintaining strong bilateral cooperation on these and other issues, while also ensuring that U.S. interests are protected, are likely to be of keen interest to Congress.

### A2 Legalization CP

#### Legalization fails-pot isn’t worth enough, and doesn’t free up enough resources to outweigh across the board institutional deficiency.

**Hope, IMCO security policy analyst, 2014**

(Alejandro, “Legal U.S. Pot Won’t Bring Peace to Mexico”, 1-21, <http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-01-21/legal-u-s-pot-won-t-bring-peace-to-mexico>, ldg)

So does this creeping legalization of marijuana in the U.S. spell doom for the Mexican drug cartels? Not quite. The illegal marijuana trade provides Mexican organized crime with about $1.5 billion to $2 billion a year. That’s not chump change, but according to a number of estimates, it represents no more than a third of gross drug export revenue. Cocaine is still the cartels’ biggest money-maker and the revenue accruing from heroin and methamphetamine aren’t trivial. Moreover, Mexican gangs also obtain income from extortion, kidnapping, theft and various other types of illegal trafficking. Losing the marijuana trade would be a blow to their finances, but it certainly wouldn’t put them out of business. But surely Mexico would experience less violence if marijuana was legal? Yes, to some extent, but the decline wouldn’t be sufficient to radically alter the country’s security outlook. In all likelihood, marijuana production and marijuana-related violence are highly correlated geographically. Marijuana output is concentrated in five states (Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, Michoacan and Guerrero) that accounted for approximately a third of all homicides committed in Mexico in 2012. Assuming improbably that half of all murders in those areas were marijuana-related, we can estimate that the full elimination of the illegal marijuana trade would reduce Mexico’s homicide rate to 18 per 100,000 inhabitants from 22 -- still about four times the U.S. rate. Well, but couldn’t the Mexican government gain a peace dividend by redirecting some resources from marijuana prohibition to other law enforcement objectives? Yes, but the effect would probably be modest. Only 4 percent of all Mexican prison inmates are serving time exclusively for marijuana-related crimes. In 2012, drug offenses represented less than 2 percent of all crime reports in the country. When it comes to only federal crimes (7 percent of the total), the share of drug offenses rises to 20 percent, but that percentage has been declining since 2007. So the legalization of marijuana won’t free up a huge trove of resources to be redeployed against predatory crime. Whatever the legal status of marijuana, Mexico needs to tackle its many institutional malfunctions. Its police forces are underpaid, undertrained, under motivated and deeply vulnerable to corruption and intimidation. Its criminal justice system is painfully slow, notoriously inefficient and deeply unfair. Even with almost universal impunity, prisons are overflowing and mostly ruled by the inmates themselves. Changing that reality will take many years. Some reforms are under way, some are barely off the ground. As a result of a 2008 constitutional reform, criminal courts are being transformed, but progress across states has been uneven. With a couple of local exceptions, police reform has yet to find political traction. The federal Attorney General’s Office is set to become an independent body, but not before 2018. The reformist zeal that President Enrique Pena Nieto has shown in other policy areas (education, energy, telecommunications) is absent in security and justice. Security policy remains reactive, driven more by political considerations than by strategic design. And results have been mixed at best: Homicides declined moderately in 2013, but both kidnapping and extortion reached record levels. Marijuana legalization won’t alter that dynamic. In the final analysis, Mexico doesn’t have a drug problem, much less a marijuana problem: It has a state capacity problem. That is, its institutions are too weak to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens. Even if drug trafficking might very well decline in the future, in the absence of stronger institutions, something equally nefarious will replace it.

#### Cartels are too diverse to be effected by just pot legalization – violence will continue

**Dickinson, former Foreign Policy assistant editor, 2011**

(Elizabeth, “legalizing\_drugs\_wont\_stop\_mexicos\_brutal\_cartels”, 6-22, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/22/legalizing_drugs_wont_stop_mexicos_brutal_cartels>, ldg)

But would legalization really work? With each day that passes, it looks like it wouldn't be enough, for one overarching reason: The cartels are becoming less like traffickers and more like mafias. Their currency is no longer just cocaine, methamphetamines, or heroin, though they earn revenue from each of these products. As they have grown in size and ambition, like so many big multinational corporations, they have diversified. The cartels are now active in all types of illicit markets, not just drugs. "Mexico is experiencing a change with the emergence of criminal organizations that, rather than being product-oriented -- drug trafficking -- are territorial based," says Antonio Mazzitelli, head of the UNODC office in Mexico City. They now specialize in running protection rackets of all kinds, he says, which might explain why the violence has gotten so bad: Mafias enforce their territorial control by force, killing anyone who resists or gets in the way. "Before, we had organized crime, but operating strictly in narcotrafficking," adds Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, a consultant and former advisor to the Mexican presidency. "Now we have a type of mafia violence ... and they are extorting from the people at levels that are incredibly high -- from the rich, from businesses." For this reason, Mazzitelli says, legalization would have "little effect." Cartels such as the Zetas and La Familia, long categorized as drug-trafficking organizations, have transformed themselves into territorial overlords. With distinctive zones of influence, complex organizations, and a wealth of manpower on which to draw, they act as shadow governments in the areas they control, collecting "taxes" on local establishments and taking a cut of the profits from illegal immigration to the United States. "This fight is not solely or primarily to stop drug trafficking," Mexican President Felipe Calderón told the U.S. Congress in May 2010. "The aim is to ensure the safety of Mexican families, who are under threat of abuse and wanton acts of criminals." The cartels' expansion may have begun through their everyday narcotrafficking work -- namely through money laundering, one of the most discussed topics in Mexican politics today. Once upon a time, this was quite easy to do; cartels could wire the money in convoluted ways or open new accounts to which individuals would report earnings from businesses that existed only on paper. But as the government cracked down in recent years, the cartels got more creative. In June 2010, Mexican authorities put strict limits on how much cash any individual could deposit into a bank on any given day or in any given month. They also limited the amount of cash one could use to buy things like airplanes or cars. So the cartels started engaging in actual trade, which helps them launder their drug profits, explains Shannon O'Neil, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington. They buy consumer goods, such as televisions and perfumes, in the United States and sell them on the Mexican side at a loss. The revenues are "clean" money. And as a bonus, the cartels have a network of vendors ready and willing to sell illicit goods. Other markets are entirely separate from the narcotics business. Perhaps the most dramatic example is oil, one of Mexico's largest exports and increasingly a vehicle for illicit trade. On June 1, the country's national oil company, Pemex, filed a lawsuit accusing nine U.S. companies of colluding with criminals linked to the drug trade to sell as estimated $300 million worth of stolen oil since 2006. That's an amount equal to the entire cocaine market in Mexico, says UNODC's Mazzitelli. In other words, if the cocaine trade dried up, the cartels would still have access to an equally large source of revenue. Equally troubling is the firearms trade, which has a direct link both to the violence and to the sustainment of the criminal organizations working across this country of 107 million. There are no reliable estimates of just how big this market is, but according to a recent U.S. Senate investigation, some 87 percent of the weapons used by the cartels are sourced from the United States. "If this were Southeast Asia, they'd be bombing the gun stores in Arizona, as if that's the Ho Chi Minh trail," says Ted Lewis, head of the human rights program at Global Exchange. Mexico's cartels have also infiltrated the government and security forces, though primarily at a local level. "Just going by all the reports -- academic and media -- we could safely assume that all municipal police departments are infiltrated," argues Walter McKay, a security consultant who has spent the last three years working in Mexico. "But it's not just the police. We focus on police and police corruption, but the entire apple is rotten." In the latest example of how high the rot goes, the ex-mayor of Tijuana, Jorge Hank Rhon, was recently arrested for gunrunning and alleged links to organized crime. Then there is the cartels' sheer size. An estimated 468,000 people worked in the drug trade in 2008, making the cartels collectively among the biggest industries in Mexico. (By comparison, the state oil company, the largest firm in Mexico, has about 360,000 employees.) The cartels also now outnumber the police, estimated at just over 400,000 personnel nationwide in 2010. The corruption and weakness of the police explains why, over the last half-decade, Calderón has deployed 50,000 troops across the country to decapitate the cartels' leadership and reclaim their territory block by block. Take away a criminal organization's leadership and turf, the thinking goes, and you also rob it of the ability to control just about every market -- not just the narcotics trade. Just on Tuesday, June 21, the government apprehended José de Jesús "El Chango" Méndez, leader of the so-called "Knights Templar" cartel. Calderón quickly touted the arrest as a "coup by the federal police against organized crime" on Twitter. Yet critics of the government's strategy say it has been far too militarized. Violence has increased every year since the drug war began, and many civil society groups here accuse the national security forces of hurting as many civilians as they do actual criminals. And even "success" risks a "balloon effect," as a cartel squeezed in one location will almost inevitably pop up elsewhere. This effect is already painfully visible in Latin America as a whole, with Mexican cartels such as the Zetas moving into Guatemala and overwhelming the much-weaker state. Many activists are thus calling for a completely new approach. Silvano Cantú, a researcher at the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, argues that Mexico needs to think bigger than trying to win back its turf city by city. "We need to be talking to everyone," he says, mentioning the United States, Colombia, Europe, and "anywhere they clean money and buy arms." The government, too, is frustrated with the guns; cutting down on the sale in the United States is one of the Calderón administration's key demands. The legalizers, a group that includes former heads of state from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, largely agree with this comprehensive approach. Trying to cut supply without cutting demand is a losing game, they argue. "The global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world," they wrote in the most recent report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, an independent panel that has called for a dramatic rethinking of the drug war. Their recommendations call for the normalization of drugs (that is, legalization of possession linked with public-health regulation), including cocaine. That would almost certainly hurt the cartels, but it probably wouldn't be enough, counters Mazzitelli of the UNODC. "Legalization is a fake solution to the problem of security," he argues, citing a 2010 Rand Corp. report that found that legalizing marijuana in California would cut cartel profits by just 2 to 4 percent. If it does come, legalization is also quite a ways off -- and Mexico's crisis is happening now. Only about half of U.S. citizens polled last year by Gallup supported legalizing marijuana, the least lucrative (and arguably the least dangerous) drug entering the country from Mexico.

## A2 Nebel T

### C/I

Counter interp: the aff may defend Mexico only. I meet. Prefer:

1. Resolvability. Country spec is the only way we can actually analyze minimum wages.

**Herr et al 9** Prof. Dr. Hansjörg Herr (teaches Economics at the Be Prof. Dr. Hansjörg Herr rlin School of Economics. He works in the field of Financial Globalisation, Development Economics and European Integration), Milka Kazandziska (studied International Economics (M.A.) at the Berlin School of Economics. She teaches Economics at the Berlin School of Economics and is Ph.D. candidate. She specialises in Economics and Labour Markets with a focus on European Integration) and Silke Mahnkopf-Praprotnik (studied International Economics (M.A.) at the Berlin School of Economics. She teaches Economics at the Berlin School of Economics. She specialises in Economics and the German Labour Market). “The Theoretical Debate About Minimum Wages.” Global Labour University Working Papers, Paper No. 6. February 2009. http://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/GLU\_Working\_Papers/GLU\_WP\_No.6.pdf

Minimum wages were first introduced in the early 19th century. Currently about 90 per cent of all countries have statutory minimum wages. However, **minimum wages** can be set in different ways and **can have fundamentally different roles in different countries**. They can be set on an hourly or monthly basis for all employees. But minimum wages can also be differentiated according to industry, profession, age, region, etc. They can be set by governments and through the collective bargaining process if the negotiated wages are declared binding for all firms in an industry. They can be set autonomously by the government with or without consultation with trade unions and employers’ associations or automatically following a certain rule of law. **While** in some instances **they may have** only a **symbolic meaning if** they are **unrealistically low, they** also **can be effective** and important **for a substantial number of employees**. Last but not least, unions may be in favour of minimum wages or against their introduction. In short: **minimum wages must ultimately be judged as part of** general **labour market institutions which reflect a country’s specific developments and constellations.**

That’s the strongest internal link to fairness because otherwise I can’t affirm the resolution-permanent structural skew. This outweighs textuality-we can’t have any debate under your interp so in this instance adherence to text is bad.

2. Stable advocacy. Without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle. Kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted out of the neg has no shot of winning. Outweighs text-no point to having a debate about the topic if I can shift.

3. Depth. Spec lets us focus the debate on an implementable policy instead of spreading ourselves thin on different issues. Focusing on one policy forces discussion on an actual issue-key to education since it ensures we’re learning things.

### Drop Arg

Reject the arg-if they win T I’ll defend general principle. A. Drop the debater T makes affirming impossible because there’s always an interp I violate. B. Abuse only happens when the judge signs the ballot in favor of something abusive, so changing the plan text now is sufficient. C. Benefits substantive education since we don’t have to end the debate and can still discuss things on substance.

### A2 Semantic First

1. Adhering to the strict resolution text does not produce fair and educational debate-the res is written by traditional 80 years old for lay debaters. We should be allowed to modify it to provide better results.

2. the ‘topicality rule’ is nonsense-you can evaluate my standards like that too. The ‘resolvability’ and ‘depth’ rule also promote fair and educational outcomes.

3. Your arguments concede the authority of fairness and education first-for example, your warrants for semantics good are that they provide for better predictability. That means it already collapses.

### A2 Nebel 14

1. Generic statements allow for specification of definite singulars, i.e. a specific group.

Leslie Sarah Jane Leslie (Professor of Linguistics at Princeton University) “Generics” https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeEncyclopediaEntry2.pdf

**Generics are statements such as “dogs are mammals”**, “a tiger is striped”, “the dodo is extinct”, “ducks lay eggs”, and “mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”. Generic statements **[they] express general claims about kinds, rather than claims about particular individuals. Unlike** other general **statements such as** “all dogs are mammals” or **“most tigers are striped”, generics do not involve the use of** explicit **quantifiers** (**such as “all” or “most”** in these examples). In English, **generics can be expressed using a variety of syntactic forms: bare plurals** **(e.g. “ducks lay eggs**”), **[or]** indefinite singulars (e.g. “a tiger is striped”), and **definite singulars [e.g.]** (“**the dog is a mammal**”). (Sometimes, **habitual statements** **such as** “Mary smokes” or “**John runs in the park**” **are classified generics**, but we will not follow this practice here.)

Prefer my definition-it’s from someone qualified in the field of grammar and literature who explicitly states that general statements allow for further specification, means it’s the most contextual and thus most likely correct. Nebel is no linguistics professor.

2. No internal link from textuality-this relies on you winning a predictability argument but I will disprove that thoroughly.

### A2 Ground

1. Side bias impact turns your offense-more aff ground is good since it compensates for 746 timeskew and reactivity-proving that I’m abusive is a reason to prefer my interp.

2. Stock positions solve all abuse-there are lots of good NCs and Ks to fall back on-means you have tiny strength of link.

3. T-The fact that there isn’t a living wage in the squo proves you have great qualitative ground-otherwise it would already happen.

4. Econ DAs about maquiladora competitiveness and employment.

### A2 Predictability/Limits

1. My interp solves. Only one country you have to prep for-Mexico.

2. T-not defending one country is unpredictable because the neg wouldn’t be able to predict the combination of countries the aff actually defends-defending one country means there is predictable offense you can pin me too.

3. Reading predictability standards kills education by limiting creativity and discouraging exploration of new ideas to what is “predictable.”

4. T-the whole res is unpredictable based on topic lit. Policy makers never implement sweeping generalizations, only plans. Topic lit determines predictability. It’s where we go for arguments.

5. Disclosure solves-this plan text has been on the wiki so you could have easily done prep by now.

*[A2 LIMITS] 6. T-you over-limit since whole rez is the only topical aff. I have no strategic leeway for crafting cases.*

### A2 Breadth

1. T-plans are key to breadth. They let us explore different areas of the topic instead of focusing on the same stock args.

2. T-cross apply my depth standard. Depth is key to breadth because if we go in depth on a different issue each round, we’re going to get a breadth of info anyway.

3. We can get breadth in other rounds. Not everyone reads plans.

### AT Research Burdens

1. Give me a break. There aren’t that many that many plans on the wiki. It’s a marginal increase in research burdens in exchange for so much rich discussion.

2. T-doing more research is good. It allows us to learn more about the topic and increase our knowledge of the world.

3. Preclusive positions solve. Go for stock NCs, impact turns, skep, whatever.